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Abstract 
Evidence is mounting of the environmental impact in the Far North of economic and industrial activity elsewhere 
in the world. While the sources of pollutants found in the Arctic are many and widespread, it is up to just a few 
countries - notably Canada, the former Soviet Union, Finland, Norway and Greenland - to assess the damage and 
deal with the impacts. This paper discusses the issue of Arctic pollution in the context of trends in world economic 
growth, globalization of economic activity, international trade and related institutional arrangements (such as trade 
and environmental agreements). The importance of tracing the sources of particular contaminants is stressed; this is 
a first step towards internalization of environmental costs of production, and is also politically a key in efforts to 
control emissions. Trade and investment agreements commonly discuss rules for cross-border flows of goods, services, 
personnel and investment capital, as well as matters specific to particular economic sectors. Cross-border flows of 
pollutants and other ‘bads’ also merit detailed sectoral attention. This linkage would make explicit the connections 
between production and pollution (making possible the ‘polluter pays’ approach), and also widen the scope for 
redistribution of economic resources to equilibrate the situation (via trade and investment measures, among others) 
if flows of goods are related directly to flows of ‘bads’. The paper examines the outlook for addressing Arctic 
pollution via international environmental agreements (along the lines of the Base1 Convention, the Montreal 
Protocol, CITES, etc.), existing and future trade agreements (such as GATT), or new institutional approaches. 
Keywords: International environmental agreements; Trade and environment; Arctic pollution control 
1. Introduction 
The signing of the Nuuk Declaration on Envi- 
ronment and Development in the Arctic marked 
a significant link in the chain of agreements aimed 
at protecting the Arctic environment. Earlier links 
include the Rovaniemi conference of Arctic rim 
states in 1989, the June 1991 signing of the Decla- 
ration on the Protection of the Arctic Environ- 
ment, adoption of the Arctic Environmental Pro- 
tection Strategy, and establishment of the Arctic 
Monitoring and Assessment Program, also in 1991 
(Soroos, 1993). 
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Meeting at Nuuk, Greenland, in September 
1993, representatives of the Ministers of the En- 
vironment of the eight circumpolar nations agreed 
to ‘cooperate, protect, and, as appropriate, re- 
store the ecosystems of the Arctic’. They pledged 
to seek resources to do this, reaffirmed their 
commitment to implementing the Arctic Environ- 
mental Protection Strategy, and agreed to es- 
tablish a working group on further policy actions 
required (Nuuk Declaration, 1993). 
Growing evidence on the degree and spread of 
arctic pollution makes it clear that ongoing inter- 
national measures to halt the continued contami- 
nation of the arctic environment are extremely 
important. This paper briefly surveys the history 
of international attempts to deal with other 
large-scale environmental problems, categorizing 
the various approaches that have been attempted 
and discussing their applicability in the case of 
arctic pollution. It also explores the opportunities 
offered by trade measures to strengthen compli- 
ance with such international environmental pacts. 
At the outset, it must be pointed out that, 
although environmental problems tend to be 
closely related to natural processes (wind and 
ocean currents, riverine drainage basins, animal 
migrations, groundwater flows, etc.), the political 
measures humans adopt to address these prob- 
lems are almost always geographically limited by 
political boundaries. Until the day, perhaps not so 
very far in the future, when political governance 
is determined by ecology, this means that any sort 
of international pollution control mechanism is 
inevitably problematic. In order to obtain cooper- 
ation from all the political jurisdictions that may 
be contributing to the environmental problem, 
the support of many constituents who are unaf- 
fected by and uninterested in the problem may be 
necessary. 
As existing and proposed international environ- 
mental agreements demonstrate, the process of 
reaching consensus on the need for and terms of 
such accords is fraught with difficulties (Mac- 
donald, 1991). Moreover, even where they have 
been approved, compliance and enforcement are 
often spotty (U.S. GAO, 1992a). 
In the absence of a global body with the au- 
thority, budget, and clout to enforce international 
environmental agreements, nations have been 
forced to fall back on traditional political mecha- 
nisms, dealing with environmental matters along 
with other international disputes (Boardman, 
1992). Indeed, some would argue that this is as it 
should be. Greve and Smith, for example, empha- 
size the crass political nature of environmental 
policy making in general, and cite the case of the 
Montreal Protocol on ozone-depleting substances 
as one in which the process of international 
agreement was influenced by and worked in favor 
of corporate interests (Benedick, 1991; McInnis, 
1992; Greve and Smith, 1992). 
From this viewpoint, a broad decision making 
process for international environmental issues, 
which would allow them to be mediated politically 
through the intervention of many different actors, 
might seem preferable to a more limited decision 
making process in which a few moneyed interests 
can hold sway. Greve and Smith advocate 
‘reforms that stimulate and institutionalize the 
competing and conflicting considerations that 
should inform the management of environmental 
risk’ (p. 185, Greve and Smith, 1992). This idea 
implies that creating special international agree- 
ments to address environmental issues may not 
be the most advisable way of addressing these 
problems; why make exceptions to the multi- 
stakeholder processes established through exist- 
ing national, diplomatic, and international policy 
channels? 
However, the pressing nature of some interna- 
tional environmental problems, and the inefficacy 
of most traditional political processes in dealing 
with them, have led to hundreds of international 
accords on environmental matters. This seems to 
be the manner of choice for addressing intema- 
tional or global environmental concerns (Stevis et 
al., 1992). About two dozen of these international 
environmental agreements contain provisions al- 
lowing the use of trade measures to encourage 
participation or enforce compliance (GATT, 1991; 
Runnals and Cosbey, 1992; Walker, 1993). 
Trade agreements themselves may be able to 
play a large role in international environmental 
issues, since trade sanctions (or the threat thereof) 
offer an important lever for bringing about inter- 
national compliance. Some environmentalists see 
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hopeful signs in the impetus toward ‘greening’ a 
post-Uruguay Round of the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and in the empha- 
sis on environmental issues and dispute settle- 
ment mechanisms in the North American Free 
Trade Agreement and its environmental side deal 
(National Wildlife Foundation, 1991; Pollution 
Probe, 1992). 
A more cynical view draws upon evidence 
concerning the growing globalization of the world 
economy and the concomitant weakening of na- 
tional governments’ power vis-a-vis transnational 
corporations (Gordon, 1993) to draw stark con- 
clusions concerning the ability of national govern- 
ments to deal adequately with international pollu- 
tion. In this analysis, even national environmental 
regulations are progressively undermined by 
transnational firms’ ease in shifting their opera- 
tions to areas with laxer rules; trade agreements 
that facilitate international transfers of capital 
and technology (but not labor) only accentuate 
the trend (Campbell, 1993). 
In the sections that follow, each of these per- 
spectives is more fully explored and discussed in 
relation to arctic pollution. The concluding sec- 
tion hazards some preliminary remarks about the 
international political economy of achieving con- 
sensus on mechanisms to address arctic pollution, 
and discusses the role of scientific research in 
achieving the levels of diplomatic commitment 
needed. 
2. International environmental agreements 
Most previous international environmental 
agreements have dealt mainly with stopping cur- 
rent and future emissions or worsening of the 
problem, not with remediating the effects of past 
contamination. Although it is tempting to want to 
address all aspects of arctic contamination with 
one policy instrument, this could inject a number 
of complications. High clean-up costs could raise 
internal political difficulties for an international 
agreement in the countries asked to help pay 
these costs, fracturing domestic support for the 
accord in signing countries. 
Unlike reductions in future benefits, which can 
be compensated for via technology and invest- 
ment shifts, or costs that fall in the future, which 
can be paid for out of future operating profits, 
lump-sum costs for clean-ups represent a signifi- 
cant drain in financial terms with little possibility 
of easing the burden. Unless these costs are to be 
paid directly by governments, with resulting da- 
mage to the international agreement’s support on 
the part of the general taxpaying public, they 
have the potential to be very damaging to the 
internal political consensus about the agreement. 
Disagreements regarding the international 
sharing of costs and benefits could also be height- 
ened if remediation of existing contamination 
were to be included in the discussion. Raising the 
stakes in money terms might well increase the 
level of conflict, and mixing clean-up costs with 
the redistribution of benefits from expected pollu- 
tion reductions in the future could greatly compli- 
cate the international negotiations. 
Parties concerned may well decide that one 
over-arching policy approach is needed to address 
both past and present/future issues related to 
arctic contamination, despite the points raised in 
the preceding paragraphs. This discussion serves 
to emphasize, however, that it is possible to delink 
present/future problems from past ones in pro- 
posing international solutions, and that different 
countries may have different roles to play in each 
of the two matters. 
The question of international leadership will 
depend in part on the forums chosen as venues 
for discussions of the arctic pollution question. 
The United Nations Environment Programme is 
poised to assume leadership in issues of this sort 
(Kimball, 1992); trade bodies such as GATT may 
also have a role to play, as discussed in the 
sections that follow; and the level of commitment 
of the countries directly involved may be suffi- 
cient to reach a regional accord on the issue. 
It should be noted that signing an international 
environmental agreement would not be enough to 
ensure that the problem would go away; moni- 
toring and enforcement mechanisms are key to 
the long-term success of any accords that may be 
struck (U.S. GAO, 1992b). As discussed later, this 
implies an ongoing institutional commitment and 
structure for ensuring that agreements are com- 
plied with to attain pollution reductions, which 
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ideally should be part of the original international 
agreement. 
3. Trade agreements 
Until very recently, about one-quarter of world 
trade took place under bilateral country-to-coun- 
try agreements, another quarter was barter 
(mainly between state trading firms of Warsaw 
Pact nations), a quarter was ‘intrafirm trade’ 
between subsidiaries of the same corporation in 
various countries, and only the remaining quarter 
involved multilateral trade of goods and services 
on the international market (Schmidheiny, 1992). 
The international trading system is currently in a 
state of flux, due to the many economic changes 
taking place in eastern Europe and the former 
Soviet Union. 
The potential impacts of trade agreements on 
arctic pollution are diametrically opposed: they 
could contribute to the problem, and/or to its 
solution. Because of the growing importance of 
trade in the world economy, and especially the 
large potential increases in multilateral trade 
between the West and the former Soviet Union, 
we examine each of these considerations in some 
detail. 
3.1. Trade agreements as a problem 
Because trade alters the international flows 
and volume of production and consumption, it 
clearly affects the environment in a number of 
ways. If adequate environmental controls are not 
in place, or are slow to be implemented as trade 
patterns shift, accelerated resource depletion and 
pollution may result. 
The environmental policies of one country may 
also affect others via trade, because all taxes, 
subsidies, and regulations affect international 
competitiveness. A country’s own environmental 
regulations may be undercut by cheap imports 
produced in countries with less stringent environ- 
mental policies, and import restrictions may be 
called for in response. (It is unlikely that such 
restrictions could be defended under the current 
GATT or NAFTA.) Industries seeking protection 
from foreign competition may, however, claim 
environmental concerns when their principal mo- 
tive is less altruistic, for example, in calling for a 
tariff against foreign paper, ostensibly because of 
the unsustainable logging practices used in its 
producing country. 
The principal international organization that 
regulates multilateral trade is GATT - the Gen- 
eral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). 
When GAIT was set up 35 years ago, environ- 
mental issues were less well understood and 
seemed less important than at present. In its 
‘General Exceptions’ provision (Article XX), 
GATT allows member countries to act to protect 
‘human, animal or plant life or health’ and to 
take ‘measures relating to the conservation of 
exhaustible natural resources if such measures 
are made effective in conjunction with restric- 
tions on domestic production and consumption’, 
(General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Arti- 
cle XX (b) and Article XX (g)), as long as these 
steps do not constitute a disguised restriction on 
international trade (GAIT, 1986). 
Much of the current debate concerning GATT’s 
environmental impact centers on whether these 
two provisions afford enough protection to permit 
legitimate environmental policies. Trade dispute 
precedents indicating how GAIT panels are likely 
to interpret these provisions are inconclusive 
(or, some environmentalists charge, ominous; 
Walker, 1993). 
Actually, few GATT disputes have arisen in 
which an environmental measure has been chal- 
lenged. The most relevant and controversial was 
the tuna-dolphin case. A GATT dispute resolu- 
tion panel ruled in September 1991 that it was a 
violation of GATT for the U.S. to ban imports of 
yellowfin tuna from Mexico and several other 
Latin American countries because of the fishing 
practices allowed there (but not in the U.S.), 
which kill dolphins accidentally caught in purse- 
seine fishing nets. The GATT panel ruled that no 
GAIT member country may restrict trade for the 
purpose of protecting the environment beyond its 
own borders (Inside U.S. Trade, 1991). 
A number of international conventions and 
protocols dealing with environmental protection 
and conservation may, under this interpretation, 
violate the GAIT - such as the 1987 Montreal 
Protocol on ozone-depleting substances, the 1989 
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Base1 Convention on transport of hazardous 
wastes, and the 1973 Convention on International 
Trade in Endangered Species (CITES) of Wild 
Fauna and Flora. More than 150 existing interna- 
tional treaties and other agreements have envi- 
ronmental implications (GATT, 1991); about 20 
of these specifically mention the possibility of 
using trade sanctions for enforcement or involve 
trade in other ways (GATT, 1992). It should be 
noted that a 1992 GAIT report puts forward the 
argument that any environmental policies that 
are broadly supported in the world community 
would not be blocked by GATT rules, because 
these can be changed or waived by two-thirds of 
the GATT member countries (pp. 5-6, GATT, 
1992). This raises the clear possibility that an 
international consensus on important environ- 
mental issues - though admittedly difficult to 
achieve - could override trade considerations 
and lead to permanent modifications of the 
GATT. 
Although no country has as yet challenged an 
international environmental agreement on trade 
grounds, it is possible that a country that was 
discriminated against might be able to win a 
GATT ruling and adopt retaliatory trade mea- 
sures, with GATT’s approval. To avoid undercut- 
ting international agreements intended to address 
pressing global environmental problems, it is im- 
portant that the order of precedence between 
such agreements and GATT be clarified (Sorsa, 
1992). 
In addition to GATT’s problematic stance on 
international environmental agreements, various 
authors have described several broad groups of 
potential problems with traditional GATT-type 
trade-agreements, from an environmental point 
of view. These include problems relating to stan- 
dards, to subsidies and other economic instru- 
ments, to investment and growth, to the permissi- 
ble uses of trade measures, and to institutional 
changes and national governance (Ritchie, 1990; 
Shrybman, 1990; Arden-Clarke, 1991; Daly, 1992; 
Canadian Environmental Law Association, 1993). 
For many environmentalists and others, trade lib- 
eralization along GATT-managed lines skews 
economic growth in an environmentally negative 
direction. 
3.2, Trade agreements as a solution 
Along with or despite the impacts noted in the 
previous section, and depending on many other 
circumstances, trade may lead to welfare and 
income increases that make environmental im- 
provements financially possible and increase peo- 
ple’s interest in them (GATT, 1992; Anderson 
and Blackhurst, 1992). Moreover, if GATT re- 
forms clarify the issue, trade measures could be- 
come an effective way of encouraging intematio- 
nal participation and compliance with environ- 
mental agreements such as the Montreal Proto- 
col. 
Several authors argue that using trade sanc- 
tions to enforce environmental agreements is a 
third-best solution, since trade itself is not the 
prime cause of the environmental problems; do- 
mestic national policies aimed directly at the is- 
sue are more efficient in bringing about the de- 
sired environmental improvements (Baumol, 1971; 
Barbier et al., 1990; Sorsa, 1992). Sorsa gives five 
arguments for why unilateral trade sanctions 
should not be used to deal with international 
environmental problems: (1) scientific evidence 
regarding many such problems is uncertain or 
subject to value judgments, (2) the source of 
pollution and the underlying causal relationship is 
often hard to establish, (3) polluters can always 
direct exports to other countries if sanctions are 
employed, (4) effects-based trade rules would be 
hard to devise, and (5) the effectiveness of sanc- 
tions would be related to the size of the country 
imposing them. Instead of trade sanctions, Sorsa 
says, countries should use moral suasion, product 
labelling, awareness building, and financial or 
technological transfers to address cross-border 
environmental problems (Sorsa, 1992). 
A response to the above arguments lies in the 
scale and importance of the international envi- 
ronmental issues being addressed, and the lack of 
alternate means of obtaining international com- 
pliance and participation. Environmental legisla- 
tion at the national level has, in many cases, 
effectively transformed local pollution problems 
into international ones, as technologies based on 
control of emissions concentrations have simply 
allowed emissions to be diluted and spread far- 
ther afield (Diwan and Shafik, 1992). 
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In Sudbury, Ontario, for example, a ‘super- 
stack’ constructed in the early 1970s on a large 
nickel smelter injected its emissions into the up- 
per atmosphere; instead of reducing pollution at 
the source, the stack simply spread the emissions 
more widely. As long as environmental regulation 
techniques and market incentive structures foster 
this trend, a viable counterbalance is imperative. 
Nations have relatively few options, short of 
war, for influencing their neighbors’ environmen- 
tal policies. Pollution control instruments com- 
monly used within countries - such as tax poli- 
cies, regulations, and tradeable emissions permits 
- are usually not applicable on the international 
level, due to the lack of institutional structures 
for implementing and enforcing them. Trade ac- 
tion, although admittedly a very blunt instrument, 
deserves serious attention. 
Although GATT rules seek to reduce govern- 
ment-imposed barriers to trade in goods and ser- 
vices, it is becoming clearer that they also facili- 
tate cross-border transfers of ‘bad&: pollution, lax 
standards, poor enforcement, and over-exploita- 
tion of resources. The argument that these are 
difficult to measure, trace, and understand, and 
subject to value judgements, speaks only to the 
need for more attention to these matters, both by 
empirical researchers and in the court of public 
opinion. Because environmental risk and harm is 
borne by the public in general, it is understand- 
able that public interest and concern in trade-re- 
lated matters is growing. 
GATT panels have decades of experience in 
determining whether trade injury to some nations 
has resulted from others’ dumping practices, sub- 
sidies, and price intervention in markets for traded 
goods. In routine trade disputes, an estimate is 
made of the amount of injury that has occurred 
and of the countervailing duty that will fairly 
compensate for others’ unfair trade practices. Al- 
though it is certainly difficult to place a dollar 
value on environmental damage, the argument 
that similar procedures cannot be constructed for 
measuring and compensating environmental 
injury is lazy at best. 
Moreover, trade agreements could be modified 
in entirely new ways to reflect their importance in 
and responsibility for addressing international en- 
vironmental problems. Consider this possible sce- 
nario: countries would be able to impose an 
across-the-board duty on all goods and services 
imported from other nations that are the source 
of cross-border pollution or other environmental 
‘bads’. The total value of the duty would be equal 
to the value of the harm or damage suffered by 
the importing country. This determination would 
be made by an international panel composed of 
environmental scientists, economists, and other 
specialists, who would hear evidence presented by 
both the importing country and the exporting 
country before setting the permissible duty. The 
effect would be to incorporate true environmen- 
tal costs into market prices in the importing/con- 
suming country. Revenues raised from the duty 
would accrue to a fund earmarked for environ- 
mental remediation and pollution prevention, 
preferably one administered internationally. 
Because the duty would be levied on all goods 
and services imported from the offending country, 
the exporting nation would be free to enact do- 
mestic policies in whatever way it chose to ad- 
dress the problem. This would allow a degree of 
equity and choice for the offending country, al- 
though, depending on the policies chosen, it could 
remove direct sectoral incentives for making the 
polluter pay. But the most significant effect of an 
across-the-board pollution duty would be to re- 
move the incentive to use environmental argu- 
ments as a cover for protectionist trade policies, 
which is probably the single thorniest issue in the 
debate on trade and environment questions. Trade 
sanctions of this sort would not be subject to the 
sort of retaliatory harassment that has character- 
ized most past sectoral disputes involving environ- 
mental claims. Existence of such a fund to pay 
up-front pollution costs would ease political ac- 
ceptance of the idea that pollution control is a 
top priority issue, and would also supplement 
other available sources of funds for pollution 
reduction and remediation. 
In order to regain its former market access to 
the importing country, after redressing the cross- 
border pollution issue, the offending country 
could reconvene the environmental panel to hear 
its new evidence on the level of cross-border 
flows. The importing country could again present 
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its own evidence as well. On particularly conten- 
tious issues, there might be a need for continuous 
monitoring systems, which could be established 
and financed jointly by both countries and 
overseen by the international environmental 
panel. 
Could such a scheme work? It would depend 
on the level of trade between the countries in- 
volved, and on the desire of both to keep trade 
flows as efficient as possible. Would it be permis- 
sible as GATT now stands? Probably not. Does it 
make sanctions imposed on environmental 
grounds more accessible to those with the most 
market power? Probably. But this is true of exist- 
ing trade rules also; and at present there is almost 
no scope for using trade agreements for environ- 
mental ends. 
Facility (GEF), and the proposed ‘Green Round 
of the GATT all demonstrate the world’s growing 
acceptance that economic and environment ques- 
tions cannot be viewed in isolation from each 
other (Trade News Bulletin, 1992). The post- 
World War II preoccupation with stimulating 
world economic development by abolishing pro- 
tectionism, which spawned GATT, is giving way 
to recognition that social and economic principles 
are at least as important as free trade for its own 
sake. 
Such an institutional arrangement would repre- 
sent an admission by the international community 
that, in some cases, trade liberalization is not the 
world’s primaxy goal. Perhaps it is premature to 
expect such an admission. The issue of arctic 
contamination offers a key opportunity to ques- 
tion old assumptions and to explore new ap- 
proaches to the reduction of long-range pollution 
flows. Environmental objectives, far from being 
subordinate to trade-related ones, are crucial to 
ensure the long-term viability of economies whose 
development trade is itself aimed at enhancing. 
There is clearly a need for ongoing internatio- 
nal discussions - in a broader forum than the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and De- 
velopment, or even the GATT - to address the 
sustainability of trade and trade’s contribution to 
overall economic sustainability in the context of 
global environmental issues. The United Nations 
Environment Programme and UNCTAD would 
be obvious choices to take the lead in forming 
such a new body @imball, 1992). 
4. Globalization and environmental controls 
If some theorists are correct, the growth of 
world trade under the aegis of trade agreements 
such as GATT serves principally to enhance the 
power of transnational corporations vis-a-vis na- 
tional governments; the ability of countries to 
shape their own economies and enact environ- 
mental controls is already on the wane (Camp- 
bell, 1993; Drache, 1993). The evidence of these 
trends is strong, and if the political will to address 
issues such as arctic pollution is elusive, this fac- 
tor should serve as an additional incentive. 
This forum would provide a context for ongoing 
discussion of world issues such as arctic pollution, 
along with global warming, ozone depletion, cli- 
mate change, redistribution of economic re- 
sources for environmental purposes, deforesta- 
tion, and many others. These issues have many 
ramifications for international trade, and trade 
implications should be incorporated into the envi- 
ronmental discussion, along with ways in which 
trade policy can further environmental ends. This 
proposal sets current practice on its head, but it 
represents a rational long-term approach to trade 
and environment questions. 
5. Requisites for international cooperation on 
Arctic pollution 
What would be required to bring about this 
shift in emphasis, in order to address arctic pollu- 
tion at an institutional level? Several factors could 
contribute: 
International initiatives such as the Brundtland . Mounting and widely accepted scientific evi- 
Commission, the United Nations Conference on dence of the scale, effects, causes, and inter- 
Environment and Development (UNCED) in Rio linkages of cross-border pollution transfers to 
de Janeiro, creation of the Global Environment the Arctic and their specific origins. 
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A groundswell of international public opinion 
calling for attention to the issue and a halt to 
continued arctic contamination. 
Recognition by world leaders and by leaders 
in the most affected and most responsible 
countries that arctic pollution is a key political 
issue. 
Willingness on the part of others who are 
affected less centrally to countenance innova- 
tive new approaches to resolving the arctic 
contamination issue, including approaches 
with implications for long-established institu- 
tions such as the GATT. 
Cleariy, these steps are all interconnected. The 
scientific community has a large and vital role to 
play in accomplishing this transformation; as in 
the case of most environmental issues, public 
information and education leading to political 
commitment is the key to change. How far-re- 
aching and effective this change can be is, in large 
part, up to those of us who are responsible for 
researching the issue and teaching others about 
the threat arctic pollution represents for the 
global environment. 
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